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I. Introduction
An important feature of the Uruguay Round agreement was the agreement by the
developed countries to  abolish the  Multifibre Arrangement quotas2 that  (with  their
predecessors) have restricted exports of textile and clothing products from developing
countries for close to forty years. This iniquitous system of quotas has violated all the
fundamental principles of the multilateral trading system, and discriminated against the
poorest countries and  those  seeking to  move up  from  reliance on  commodity trade
towards an emphasis on manufactures.
While enormously welcome, the prospective abolition of these quotas will not
necessarily generate automatic benefits to individual countries. Developing countries had
to invest a large amount of their negotiating capital into securing the developed countries'
agreement to abolish these quotas. As Mattoo and Subramanian (1999) argue, they may
need to press hard to ensure that the abolition of the quotas goes according to plan.
The abolition of the quotas will create opportunities for developing countries, but
will  also  expose  them  to  additional  competition  from  other,  formerly  restrained,
exporters. The outcome for any individual country will depend heavily on its policy
response. Countries that take the opportunity to streamline their policies, and improve
their competitiveness, are likely to increase their gains from quota abolition.
In this paper, we start by providing a simple introduction to the economics of the
MFA, using a simple diagrammatic treatment of the impacts of MFA-type quotas.  In
section III, we examine some of the empirical evidence, focussing particularly on India.
Kathuria and  Bhardwaj  (1998) have  recently provided  some  new  results  on  the
magnitude of the effective taxes imposed by the MFA on India's exports of textiles and
1  The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the
World Bank  (Kathuria and Martin are at The World Bank, while Bhardwaj works at Winrock International). We are
grateful to DK Nair, Secretary General of the Indian Cotton Mills Federation, for numerous discussions on the subject
over the last two years, which have contributed greatly to our understanding of the Indian textiles industry.  We also
thank Garry Pursell for useful comments and suggestions.clothing.  This  paper further updates those  results  and, in  section IV, examines the
domestic distortions affecting this industry.  Section V reviews some of the evidence on
the likely impact of MFA abolition on South Asia, and of the implications of domestic
reforms in India before and after the abolition of the MFA, and section VI concludes.
11.  The  basic  economics  of the  MFA
A key feature of the quotas imposed under the MFA is that they are imposed only
by a subset of countries, and only on exports from a subset of exporters. For an individual
exporter, the impact of these quotas is to restrict access to the MFA importer markets.
and  to  encourage  diversion of  its  exports  from  these  restricted markets  to  other.
unrestricted, markets. An important feature of this policy regime is that the importers
allow the exporters to allocate the quotas, and hence to benefit from the higher prices in
the restricted markets. This is perhaps because the original system of quotas from whick
the MFA evolved was of such doubtful legality under the GATT.
The basic economic implications of the MFA for an individual exporter can be
summarized in the simple diagram drawn from Martin and Supachalasai (1990) and
presented  as Figure  1. To  keep the  diagram simple, we base  it on  the widely-used
Armington  assumption that  the  products  produced by  the  exporter  of  interest  are
differentiated from those produced by other countries. This allows us to  draw well-
defined import demand curves for the country's products in the restricted markets (DR),
and in the unrestricted markets (Du).  The horizontal summation of these two demand
curves  gives  the  global  demand  (DT)  for  the  exports  from  the  exporter  under
consideration. In the absence of any quota restrictions, as in Figure 1, the intersection of
this total demand curve, and the export supply curve from the country in question, will
yield the uniform price at which exports are sold.










3In the undistorted equilibrium represented in Figure 1, the same price applies in
both the 'restricted' (the restriction, of course, comes about in Figure 2) and unrestricted
markets, and the allocation of exports between the two markets depends only on the
magnitude of demand in those markets. When quotas are introduced in the restricted
market as shown in Figure 2, the quantity exported to this market declines. Because of
the restrictions, the price received for exports to the restricted market increases from p, to
PR. However, the price received for exports to the unrestricted  market declines from Pw  to
Pu (which is the new world price/marginal price).  Note also that the overall demand
curve facing the country (D'T) becomes steeper, and hence less elastic, because of the
zero elasticity of demand in the restricted market. Because the marginal price of output
falls, the  volume of  output  in the  industry unambiguously declines.  Whether static
welfare increases or decreases depends upon whether the gain in the restricted market
export market as compared with the situation in  figure 1 (represented by the cross-
hatched area in Figure 2) outweighs the losses in the unrestricted markets (represented by
the vertically shaded area in Figure 2).3
The overall impact of the MFA on a country's  welfare cannot, of course, be
determined simply by the static welfare impacts in Figure 2. A major problem with gains
that accrue in the form of rents is that they set off what Bhagwati has termed Directly
Unproductive (DUP) activities in which enterprises and individuals use real resources in
the pursuit of the quota rents. Krishna and Tan (1998) point out that the systems of quota
allocation used in the South Asian countries encourage such activities. Quota allocations
are frequently based on historic export performance, creating an incentive for firms to
increase their exports to  unrestricted third markets even when these are not  directly
profitable, thus increasing the losses accruing in unrestricted markets. A further source of
loss with the quota rents is losses to exporters through rent sharing. When export quotas
are finely defined, some major importers appear to acquire sufficient market power to be
able to appropriate some of the quota rents.
3Producer  welfare in Figure I is represented by the area between Pw  and the supply curve S.  The gain in
welfare in Figure 2 is the area above Pw  (the cross-hatched area), while the area below Pw is the  loss in
welfare (the vertically hatched area).
4While Figure 2 provides a basis for evaluating the partial impact of quotas on a
single country's exports, it is inadequate as a basis for evaluating the overall impact of
the MFA on a country because it does not take into account the impact of restrictions on
other countries'  exports. Restrictions on other countries'  exports tend to  increase the
demand for exports from the country of interest. It is clearly possible that some exporters
might benefit in the short term from these arrangements if they are less restricted than
other countries. Traditionally, small suppliers have tended to have an advantage in that
they were  less likely to trigger quotas than major suppliers such as India or China.
However, in recent years, the key gainers in terms of restricted market access have been
relatively large suppliers such as Mexico, Turkey and the Central European countries that
have benefited from regional preferences granted by the major importers.
One very crude indicator of the restrictiveness of the  quotas for a  particular
country is the share of its exports directed to quota markets. If all countries were broadly
similar, one might expect the share of exports directed to quota and non-quota markets to
be roughly the same. 4 Since each country's MFA quota levels are based on more or less
arbitrary historical factors, there are good reasons to anticipate that they will result in
barriers whose export tax equivalents vary considerably between exporter-importer pairs.
Under these circumstances, the shares of export revenues from restricted and unrestricted
markets can be expected to vary. The more competitive a country, relative to its quota
allocation, the greater is likely to be the share of its export revenues that it receives from
sales outside the restricted markets.  A better indicator, where this is available, is the
export tax equivalent of the MFA quotas that restrict exports from one supplier to a
particular market.
All of the analysis to this point has been comparative static in nature. When we
take a dynamic perspective on the problem, the costs of the MFA are potentially more
serious. A  key feature  of an outward-oriented development process seems to  be the
identification of industries where relatively high levels of productivity can be achieved.
Bernard and Jensen (1999) find that it is the expansion of such industries, rather than
4 Of course, countries are not the same, and there may be reasons, such as proximity or historical performance, for
some countries to have much higher shares of exports to quota markets. However, the export share still provides a
useful benchmark.
5learning by doing within industries, that appears to account for the bulk of the potentially
formidable gains  associated with  export growth. Where superior technology can be
introduced into an economy with low productivity in other sectors, and hence low factor
prices, such a sector is, at first, extremely profitable. When the policy environment is
sufficiently accommodating, and the infrastructure adequate, such a leading sector can
grow extremely rapidly. The extraordinary growth rates achieved by the clothing export
industry in Bangladesh, where exports are said to have grown by around 100 percent a
year for 25 years, highlight this phenomenon.
The presence, or the continuing threat, of export quotas reduces the opportunity
for developing countries to use the  relative ease of adopting new technology in the
clothing sector as a first step on the ladder of economic development. At the other end of
the  product  life  cycle,  it  encourages  economies  like  Hong  Kong,  whose  natural
comparative advantage in this labor-intensive industry has largely gone, to continue in
production because of the quota rents that are available to incumbent exporters.
Ml.  Export  Tax Equivalents  5
One of the major problems associated with non-tariff barriers such as quotas is
their lack of transparency.  The presence of a quota of a certain size provides no clear
indication as to whether exports are being restricted by a large or a small amount.  MFA
quotas are administered by exporters, and hence the value of the scarce quotas accrues to
those exporters who hold the quotas. In order to export apparel or textile goods subject to
quota, exporters must either buy quotas for these goods, or pass up the opportunity of
selling quotas they already hold. For many purposes, it is useful to think of an export
quota as being effectively the same as an export tax in its restrictive impact on exports.
The price of a quota per unit of exports is then equivalent in its impact to an export tax of
the same magnitude. If we divide the quota price by the value of the good in the absence
of quotas, we obtain a measure of the quota rent in proportion to the value of the export.
This  is  potentially  a  very  useful  indicator of restrictiveness, allowing the  countries
imposing the protection, and those suffering from it, to know what rate of protection is
5  This section is based on an update of Kathuria and Bhardwaj (1998).
6being imposed. It captures the degree of excess demand in the form of a price, given the
demand and supply situation at a point of time for a particular product.
Table 1. Export Tax Eq  ivalents for Indian Garment  ExDorts to the USA and the EU (Percent)
Category  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993
USA:
Group I
Weighted average  41.71  29.06  26.49  31.3  41.2  37.8  44.1
Simple average  32 22  23.95  23.11  23.4  25.9  24.7  32.8
Group 11
Weighted average  31.36  5.17  5.1  0.6  0.8  9.7  5.8
Siinple average  35.63  4.83  5.19  1.3  1.5  14.6  13.8
Total
Weiglited average  40,21  25.9  23.92  28.0  36.9  35.7  38.8
Simple average  34.84  9.18  9.67  6.4  7.2  17.1  18.5
Cotton
Weighted average  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  38.9  51.0  50.9  48.2
Simple average  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  14.2  15.8  23.7  28.1
Synthetics
Weighted average  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  16.4  16.4  13.0  4.7
Simple average  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10.4  13.1  19.0  11.8
EU:
Total
Weiglited average  18.77  14.78  15.49  18.6  14.4  13.9  14.0
Simple average  17.08  12.07  13.36  14.8  11.9  12.9  12.5
Cotton
Weighted average  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  17.4  13.3  14.1  13.7
Simple average  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  16.2  12.7  14.3  14.3
Synthetics
Weighted average  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  22.9  16.8  9.0  14.5
Simiple  average  n.a.  n.a.  na.  12.6  10.6  11.4  10.1
The quota price corresponds to the difference between  PR  and Pu in Figure 2.
Export tax equivalents (ETEs) are calculated here on the basis of unit values of exports,
as [QP/(UV-QP)]*  100, where QP is the quota price and UV the unit value of exports 6.
The ETE indicates the  quota premium as a  percentage of the unit value of  exports
excluding the premium. 7 Kathuria and Bhardwaj (1998) give details of individual ETEs
calculated for each quota category.  In this paper, we only report the quotas aggregated
by country or region and by fiber.
6 We define the export tax equivalent (ETE) as the value of the quota divided by the price received by a producer who
does not own quota for this product.
71n  figure 2, the ETE is [( PR-  Pu)/Pu* 100.
7In this exercise, we focussed on the two largest markets for Indian textiles and
garments, the USA and the EU, which accounted for 73 percent of total textile and
garments exports  in  1995/96  (66 percent  of  garment exports  in  1998/99).  As  a
proportion of quota-restricted (MFA) markets, their share is even higher, accounting for
94 percent of total garment exports in 1998/99.  For the USA as a whole, Table 1 shows
that overall (weighted by value of exports) ETE, which was 38.8 percent of the unit value
of exports in  1993, and 36-37 percent in  1994 and 1995, declined over the next three
years, before picking up in  1999 to  over 40 percent.  Exports to the EU appear less
restricted, with aggregate weighted ETEs being around 14 percent between 1993 and
1995, increasing to about 19 percent in 1996,  and going back to that level in 1999 after
declining in 1997 and 1998.
The table also displays the simple averages, which show the same trend over time
as do the weighted averages.  One difference worth pointing out is that the simple and
weighted averages are much more disparate in  the case of the USA than the  EU--
implying that the dispersion of individual product ETEs is much lower in the EU.  Also,
for 1995-1998, the simple average ETE is larger for the EU than for the USA.  Finallv,
Table 1 shows, until 1996, ETEs for synthetics and cottons.  For the USA, the ETEs for
cotton products are higher. This tendency is not evident in the EU.
Exports to  the US  are divided into two categories, Group I  and II.  Group I
products have quotas defined for individual products, such as gents shirts, ladies blouses,
etc.  For Group II, the quotas are administered for all the products (such as  gloves,
handkerchiefs, knit shirts, etc.) in the group as a whole-as  a result, the quota premium is
the same for all the products within the group, and the variations in ETE arise only from
differences in unit values (see Kathuria and Bhardwaj (1998) for product-wise ETEs).
For the USA, in 1995, Group II garments had seen their ETE decline sharply, but owing
to the low weight of Group II in the total, the weighted average did not decline.  It was
only in 1996, when some of the important Group I garments (338- knit shirts and blouses)
saw a sharp fall in their ETE, that the weighted ETE for Group I as well as for the USA
as a whole fell. The recovery in 1999, on the other hand, relates to increases in ETEs for
both Group I as well as Group II products (especially Group II).
8It should also be noted  that ETEs in the range of 28-40 percent for the USA are
higher than the actual tariffs levied by the USA on imports of textiles and apparel, and
give one (partial) indication of the hidden cost of the MFA, both for the exporting as well
as the importing country.
The presence of substantial ETEs in the Indian garment and textiles industry is
indicative  of  excess demand, given quota allocations.  After  what  appears to  be  a
temporary decline in 1997 and 1998, the ETEs for Indian garments recovered strongly in
1999.  These high ETEs mean that there may be static welfare gains (see Figure 2) for
India-- but which need to be set off against possible declines in prices in unrestricted
markets.  However, a  more fundamental loss would seem to be the loss of potential
output and all its associated welfare impacts in terms of employment growth, productivity
growth and potentially high profits.
There is little doubt that the ETEs could have been even higher, had there been
lesser domestic constraints in the operation of Indian firms.  To put it another way, India
has the potential to benefit substantially from the abolition of quotas in terms of increased
market access, employment and output growth, and productivity gains. Policy constraints
need to be eased for another and even more immediate reason-the  threat of increased
imports arising from the removal of domestic import restrictions with effect from April
2001.8 Such constraints, which are well-known in India, are the subject of the following
section.
IV. Domestic Policy Constraints in India
Domestic policy constraints have long affected the textile and clothing industries
in South Asia. These constraints are particularly severe in India, which has perhaps a
stronger tradition of intervention in industry policies than other South Asian countries.
Many of the distortions that reduce the efficiency of the sector are quite complex, and
assessments of their impact require detailed studies of the sectors.
A surge of imports is, however, unlikely, given that Indian garments and textiles are largely quite cost competitive.
9Disincentives to operating in the factory mode
The garment industry is based on a system of decentralized production.  This
owes at least partly to the existence of labor legislation and the lack of an effective exilt
policy, as well as the reservation of garment (until recently) and hosiery production for
the small-scale sector. 9 However, decentralized production also has natural advantages
such as cheap labor in the subcontracted  firms as well as flexibility of production. The tax
regime  which  grants  exemptions  and  concessions  in  tax  payments  to  small-scale
producers  also  favors the decentralized mode.  The question that  now needs to  be
addressed is whether the decentralized system of production is getting to be a constraint
to investment and therefore to increased productivity and growth of the apparel industry.
Indian garment exports have been niche-based, focusing on low volume and high
variety  of  outputs,  within the broad  area  of  fashion  clothing and  especially  ladies
outerwear.  The flexibility in the Indian production system is eminently suited to meet
this demand.  In fact, the nature of demand and the characteristics of the production
system are mutually reinforcing. The downside of relying on fabricators is that there are
likely to be variations between different lots of output. This effectively prevents India
from  becoming  a major player  in the mass market for  clothing,  which  demands  good  and
consistent quality across huge volumes of a single item of clothing, such as in uniforms.'
Moreover, the average quality of output, although much improved, still has not allowed iA
to go beyond the middle price range.
All the countries with very successful garment exports have a much lower level of
subcontracting than India.  As Khanna (1993: 285) points out, apparel firms in India
subcontracted 74 percent of their output, compared with only 1  1 percent for Hongkong.
18 percent for China, 20 percent for Thailand, 28 percent for South Korea and 36 percent
9 Alam (1991),  in a study of small industrial firms, found that firms deliberately minimize the size of the labor force ir
order to reduce the bargaining power of employees and to avoid legal obligations towards them.  The most common
way to do this is to separate the most labor intensive production process, ie fabrication in the case of garments, and get.
this work done by outside contractors.  As part of the National Textile Policy 2000, garments production was de-
reserved and the production of garments by large firms in India was no longer barred.
0 In Khanna's (1993) study of  149 apparel manufacturers in five countries of SE Asia, manufacturers in Hong Kong
and Thailand observed that Indian garments lacked consistency and uniformity in quality.
10for Taiwan.  All these countries have a broader base of exports, and have done very well
in the market for large volumes of uniform products.  Khanna also presents evidence to
show that apparelfir-ms are more productive in East Asian coulitres  than India-- and this
is due to far larger investments in machinery, even in the case of low-wage China. Even
within machinery investment, Indian firms tend to invest more in sewing machines, and
investment in processing and special machines form a very small part of the total."  1  The
implication of this and the previous paragraph is that in order for Indian exports to grow
substantially  beyond  present  levels,  there  will  be  a  need  to  change  the  current
overwhelming reliance on fabricators.
Much of the garment industry is aware that factory investment is needed, but has
been unwilling to commit itself to larger investments.  This is partly because of failures
of some high-profile garment factories, at least partly on account of labor problems.  It is
not as if there are no large organized sector firms in the country-quite  the contrary.  If
so, what makes the garment industry so different or unable to handle the labor issue?
Perhaps it is the high export orientation of the industry as well as its focus on fashion
goods, wherein even a short strike can cripple the firn.' 2 A second reason for lack of
investment in factories is that the domestic fabric base is not fully compatible with the
demands of factory production, with large lengths of uniform lots of fabric, which are
needed for factories, not being produced in the domestic sector.  This is because fabrics
are sourced largely from  (small) powerlooms and/or because of lack of good quality
dyeing and printing facilities for fabrics.
Typewise  Average  Number  of Machines installed by each Apparel Export  Firm
Precutting  machines  Cutting  machines  Sewing  machines Special  machines  Processing  machines
S. Korea  2.9  12.3  134.3  77.5  31.0
Taiwan  2.6  7.5  185.1  49.5  12.8
Hongkong  2.3  13.2  455.4  112.7  27.9
China  2.3  13.2  450.5  104.8  34.4
Thailand  2.0  12.8  460.8  72.4  21.9
India  0.0  2.3  103.7  8.6  4.6
Source: Kathuria and Bhardwaj(1998),  p.  17, drawnfrom Khanna (1993)
12  In the case of non-fashion goods, since the demand for any good may last longer than for fashion goods, firms may
be able to ride out a short strike, even if by selling at a discount to another buyer.
11Our own judgment on this is that subcontracting is a low-risk low-capital strategy.
With subcontracting, the bulk of the labor force is "outsourced", which results in a major
decline in fixed costs.  Investments in equipment and factory space are also minimized.
Exporters are unwilling to trade this  off  against an unproven and high  risk strategy,
unless their backs are pushed to the wall (i.e. demand for the present kind  of products
starts declining), which has not happened so far.  Risks are high because:  One, labor
becomes a  fixed cost in  India owing to the  grave difficulty of  shedding labor in  an
industry where  demand can be cyclical.  Two, while investing in  a large  factory for
garments, exporters have to make a commitment to export 50 percent of their output in
perpetuity (now no  longer required after de-reservation of garments in 2000).  While
actual exports may be more than the commitments, the obligation and the attendant
monitoring  of the  export obligation (the Inspector Raj  syndrome) by  the  authorities
enhance the risk perception for the investor. Three (and this is more speculative), the
factory mode may make the final product more expensive (albeit of higher quality), for
which the off-take from the domestic market is uncertain, since it is still highly price
sensitive. This may make the exporter more export-oriented than he would like to be/or
the government requires him to be.
Fiber Bias, Product Reservation and Hank Yarn Obligation
Perhaps the most critical aspect is the policy bias against synthetic fibers.  Thlis
arose from the view that "...cotton is for the masses and synthetics for the classes!"'  "  as
well as a  concern for cotton producers.  Man-made fibers (MMF) have always been
subject  to  higher rates  of  indirect taxation  vis-a-vis  similar  cotton  based  products.
Moreover, domestic costs of manufacturing synthetic fibers and polyester filament yarn
are high on account of uneconomic plant size in an industry where scale economies were
very important.  This arose from the industrial licensing policy which licensed relatively
small plants for production of specified outputs with little inter-fiber flexibility.  The
latter policy changed with the coming of the textile Policy of  1985, which adopted a
distinct multi-fiber approach.  However, although the gap has narrowed, tax policies still
3 Ramakrishna  (1995:  5), in a discussion  paper  on restructuring  the textile  industry.
12discriminate against MMF vis-a-vis cottons, and this  discrimination at the fiber stage
continues into the yarn and fabric stages. For example, while the excise duty on cotton
yarn in 1997-98 was 5.75%, it was 20.7% on blended yarn and 34.5% on PFY (Polyester
Filament Yarn).14 Moreover, imported inputs for production of PSF (Polyester Staple
Fiber) and PFY are still subject to high duties (for example, in 1998, it was 25 percent on
DMT, PTA and MEG and 30 percent on caprolactum).  l 
While the policy bias is narrowing, the differential still prevails in the following
way: one, controls on export of cotton and cotton yarn mean that prices of raw cotton are
typically below international prices, which is an implicit subsidy to the consumers of
cotton; two, the still high import duties on synthetic yarn and intermediates;  three, the
domestic duties such as excise are lower for cotton fabrics.  This combines with a trade
regime that, despite improvements, remains cumbersome and imposes high transaction
costs, for example, when exporters claim duty drawback on exports or want duty-free
imports for exports.  The combination of the cotton bias and the high transaction costs
imposed by the trade regime has meant that India's production, consumption and export
of textiles and garments is still heavily weighted in favor  of cotton based products.  For
example, cotton exports  were 83 percent by volume  and 75  percent by value of  all
apparel exports from India in 1993, and this has fallen only slowly to 81 percent and 71
percent  respectively  in  1998. As  against  this,  world  exports  and  consumption  are
predominantly in the synthetic blends.
4 For details, see World Bank (1997), volume 11.  annex].
IS  The decline in the policy bias can be seen from the gradual decline over the years in the rates of customs duty on
synthetic fibers and inputs into the production of synthetic fibers.  Customs duties (not including countervailing duty
which is essentially the excise duty on the imported good) on the most important fibers  have declined: for VSF
(Viscose Staple Fiber), from 60 percent in 1987, to 25 percent in 1996; for PSF and ASF (Acetate Staple Fiber), from
more than 150 percent in 1987, to 45 percent in 1996 and 32 percent in 1997.  Duties on inputs such as DMT, PTA,
MEG, Caprolactum and Acrylonitrile have declined from 90-195 percent in 1987 to 20-45 percent in 1996. Along with
this, the domestic industry has also become more competitive, both at the input stage as well as the output of fibers.
This can be seen via declining NPCs (Nominal Protection Coefficients i.e. basic ex-factory price/cif price) for fibers.
Declining NPCs signify that domestic production is becoming more competitive and NPC less than one means that
domestic production is cheaper than the international benchmark,  VSF was already close to international prices by
1987 (NPC of 1.05) and has consistently had an NPC less than one thereafter.  PSF and ASF, the fibers which were less
competitive to begin with, have also seen a steady decline in their NPCs, from 2.5-3 in 1984 to 1.3-1.5 by 1993 (helped
by the  devaluation of  the rupee  in  1991 and  a depreciation thereafter), and by  1996 all the three  fibers were
competitive.  The inputs that go into fiber production have also witnessed declining NPCs in all cases, and at least for
two of the most important (DMT and PTA), domestic prices were competitive by 1996.  See Kathuria and Bhardwaj
(1998: Tables 10 and I1).
13The potential gains from promoting a true multi-fiber policy cannot be precisely
estimated, but the possibilities are very promising.  One could think of an increase in
India's  overall  exports  based  on the  world  demand pattern  of  non-cotton to  cotton
consumption, using as a base the current value of cotton based exports.  In 1998-99, 71
percent of garment exports of US$ 5269 million and 70 percent of all textiles exports
including garments of US$ 8387 million were cotton-based. If, on the other hand, cotton-
based exports had been only 50 (40) percent of total exports, and assuming no decrease in
cotton exports, total exports of textiles in 1998-89 would have been US$ 11742 (14677 if
40 percent), and garments would have been US$ 7482 million (9352 if 40 percent). Thus,
had India's policies not been cotton-biased, its textile and garments exports could have
been as much as 75  percent higher than they are today, on this count alone. Of course the
domestic bias could have been substantially mitigated had the import duty drawback alnd
the duty free import for export system worked efficiently.
Promotion of the handloom sector has been a central feature of the textile policy
in India. According to the Ministry of Textiles Annual Report of 1998-99, handlooms
provide direct and indirect employment to over 12.4 million weavers.  This, along with
its  desire to  preserve culture  and heritage, has meant that the Government has used
several instruments to prop up the handloom sector. One of these is the reservation of  1  I
textile articles (such as cotton and silk sarees, dhotis, towels, lungis, bedsheets, shawls,
blankets, etc.) for exclusive production in the handloom sector, according to the latest
policy on this issue dated August 1996.  The implementation of this policy got a boost
when in  1994, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions challenging the Handlooms
(Reservations  of  Articles  for  Production)  Act  1985.  In  1995-96, the  government
inspected 63280 powerlooms and lodged preliminary complaints (FIRs) against 15 for
violation of this order!
The futility of this policy can be gauged from the fact that there were, according
to  Government estimates, as many as  1.4 million powerlooms in India by the end of
1995.  As  Misra  (1993)  points  out,  the  policy  ignores  the  dismal  past  record  of
enforcement measures as well as the huge administrative machinery that is required to
enforce this policy.  Besides requiring this totally unproductive administration, the policy
14is also a breeding ground for corruption.  It is no surprise that Misra concludes that the
Act has made little material difference to the state of the handloom sector.  On the other
hand, it has penalized domestic industry as a whole.  As in the case of SSI, foreign-made
products  in  the form  of  imports can  compete with these 22  items, even as domestic
industry is kept out.
Impact of the Hank Yarn Obligation:  The policy stipulates that spinning mills
should supply not less than 50 percent of the yarn marketed by them in the form of hanks
for use by the handloom sector.  Hank yarn is exempted from excise and sales tax, and
opens up the possibilities of corruption, misdeclaration and so on.  There have been both
direct costs of this policy as well as the longer term impact on investment decisions.
Misra  (1993)  advocates that  the  obligation be  done  away  with,  and  if  necessary
independent hank reeling centers close to handloom concentrations could be set up by
handloom development agencies. 16
All these policy restrictions impair the efficiency of the industry and result in an
upward shift in its  supply curve. This in turn results in lower measured Export Tax
Equivalents than would have prevailed in  a  less constraining policy environment (a
downward shift in the supply curve results in an increase in the quota price-intuitively,
it can be thought of as an increase in competition for the same quota). Removing these
restrictions will be vital in the post quota world where competitiveness will be the key.
Key Policy Imperatives
To  summarize the policy discussion, India's textile industry will benefit from  policy
action along the following lines:
*  Reduction of disincentives  for factory mode production.  Following the recent repeal
of the reservation of garments production for small-scale units, a major disincentive
for factory mode production has been removed. 17 Policies such as these, which are
16 For details, see annex 3, World Bank, vol. 2 (1997: 10-12). Also see Misra (1993: 223-26).
17 However, hosiery products are still  reserved.  As per the 2000 National Textile Policy, the reservation will be
reviewed.  See Husain Committee (1998), World Bank (1998) and Chatterjee and Mohan (1993) for more details on
how the small industry policy impacted production, output, quality, etc. The Husain Committee on small-scale industry
recommended complete abolition of small scale reservation in all sectors.
15unique to India, have allowed China, with very similar factor endowments, to march
well ahead of India in the export business.  Secondly, and accompanying SSI de.-
reservation,  introduction of  a  labor policy  wherein  labor  can  be  retrenched  if
necessary, with appropriate safeguards.' 8 Part of the pressure for these changes is
already appearing from international buyers, who are demanding to see factory-type
production in conditions where they can be confident about productions systems and
quality control, and working conditions.
*  Removal  of  the policy  bias  (high  taxation)  against  synthetic fibers  (which  is
admittedly lower than in the past), thereby increasing the domestic base of synthetic
fibers and providing the factories an additional source of demand, and providing an
avenue to increase exports in a major way.19  Cheaper domestic sourcing may also
reduce the need for exporters to import synthetic fibers and would thereby reduce
their transaction costs.
*  Eliminating the reservation  for exclusive handlooms  production will enable large and
small Indian firms to compete equally with large foreign firms (who cannot be barred
from  exporting these  products to  India), and  eliminate the  large  administrative
apparatus  that  polices  compliance with  this,  thereby  reducing  the  bureaucratic
(Inspector Raj) cost imposed on firms.  In a very similar vein, eliminating the hank
yarn  obligation will help.  Neither policy has been successful at propping up the
uncompetitive segments within  handlooms.  The  2000  National  Textile  Policy
promises  to  review these policies "keeping in  mind the needs  of  the handloom
industry."
*  Other policies of a more generic nature will also help. For example, making imported
fabrics available for export production in an effective manner: currently, there are
long delays in shipnients, clearance and there are several problems in the operation of
18 The Finance Minister's 2001/02 Budget speech announced that the Industrial Disputes Act and Contract Labor Act
will be amended.  The implementation of this announcement would allow easier layoffs for firms with less than 1000
workers and facilitate contractual hiring and outsourcing of jobs.
19
16the duty free input for exports schemes. 20 In general, the transaction costs of trading
remain very high, and contribute in a substantial way to the anti-export bias that still
persists  in  the  Indian  economy.  Finally, continued  easing of  trade  constraints
including reduction in the high rates of customs tariffs will also facilitate exports. 21
V. Implications of Reform
Recent studies using general equilibrium modeling techniques have examined the
implications of abolition of the MFA for South Asia. Another relevant series of studies
has assessed the implications of domestic reforms in India before and after the abolition
of the MFA.
Evaluating the implications of MFA abolition requires a model comprehensive
enough to take into account the interactions between suppliers and their distortions, as
well as the interactions between the textile and clothing sectors and other sectors of each
economy. This requirement tends to lead to the use of computable general equilibrium
models,  which  can  incorporate these  different  features. Several  such  studies  were
conducted as part of the evaluation of the Uruguay Round, including Hertel, Martin,
Dimaranan and Yanagishima (1996), and Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996).
Both of these studies concluded that South Asia in total would be a significant
beneficiary from abolition of the MFA. Hertel et al conclude that the gains to the region
would be around $2 billion per year. These results point to substantial overall gains that
are likely to be greater, if anything, today than they were estimated to be in 1996, because
of the increases in export tariff equivalents reported above, and because of completion of
regional arrangements (NAFTA and Europe/Central Europe/Turkey) that have caused
trade diversion away from South Asia.
Abolition of the quotas will also greatly increase the return from reforms in the
domestic  industry. Abolition will also  increase the  defensive need  for  South Asian
countries to improve productivity in these sectors, since countries that do not reform to
20 See Nair and Kaul (1996).
17increase  their  efficiency  will  face  greatly  increase  competitive pressure,  as  other
exporters currently repressed by the quotas will also be liberalized.
Elbeheri, Hertel and Martin (1997), examine the implications of a  number cf
policy reforms that increase productivity in the textile and clothing industries in India.
One experiment considers reforms that raise labor productivity in the clothing sector by
67 percent, to reach roughly the level enjoyed by China. Such an increase in productivitvy
would seem a realistic goal for policy reforms such as reductions in the disincentives for
operating  in  factory mode, and  allowing FDI  in  the industry. The  experiment was
undertaken both before and after abolition of the quotas to assess the importance of prior
abolition of the MFA. The welfare results were then decomposed to allocate them to their
sources. The results of the experiment are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Welfare impacts of reforms that raise labor productivity in the clothing sector
$US 1992  million.  _
Total Welfare  Terms  of trade  Allocative  Productivity
efficiency
Before  abolition  577  62  74  442
After abolition  1700  476  255  970
The total welfare gains in Table 2 are divided into direct impacts of productivity
growth, increases in allocative efficiency, and terms of trade gains. The welfare gains
resulting from productivity increases depend on the size of the sector in which the gain
occurs. The gains in allocative efficiency depend upon the induced changes in quantities
of exports and imports passing over trade barriers-the  higher the barriers over which
additional imports come, the larger the difference between the value of imports in the
country and their external cost, and the larger the gains from additional imports 22. The
21 See World Bank (2000), Chapter 6, for details relating to India's tariffs and other trade-related policies.  The stud)
also documents the increasing use of anti-dumping practices, and argues that improving India's domestic policies will
be more beneficial in the long run, as opposed to practices that increase protection and thereby the anti-export bias.
Fukase and Martin (2000) show that this source of welfare gains can be substantial. In the case of Vietnam gaining
MFN access to the US market, this accounted for 40 percent of the welfare gain.
18terms of trade changes depend on the impacts of the reform on the average prices for
India's exports.
Somewhat surprisingly, the terms  of trade  effects reported  in  Table  2  were
positive  in both  of the experiments considered. Two main  factors contribute to  this
result 23. The first is that the boost to productivity in the clothing industry causes it to
draw resources from other sectors. As a consequence, exports of all goods other than
clothing fall, leading to  an increase in the export prices received for these goods. A
second important factor is that the elasticity of substitution 24 for clothing in the GTAP
database is twice as high  as for most other products (Huff et al, p125), making the
elasticity of export demand for clothing higher than for other products. This difference in
elasticities means that the terms of trade losses resulting from falls in the export price for
clothing are less than the gains for other goods.  In the first case in Table 2, i.e., before
abolition of quotas,  an additional factor comes into play. In  this  situation, the rent-
inclusive price received for exports to quota markets does not  decline even after an
increase in clothing exports-rather,  the quota rents received by India increase in these
markets. Clearly, there is some uncertainty about whether the terms of trade effects will
be positive in all cases. What is important for our purposes is whether the gains from
reform rise or fall as a result of quota abolition.
From Table 2, it is very clear that the gains from reforrns are much higher after
abolition of the quotas. Part of this increase merely reflects the greater size of the industry
after abolition of the quotas. For this larger industry, a given increase in productivity has
a greater positive impact. Another substantial source of welfare gains is the improvement
of the terms of trade effect resulting from abolition of the quotas. Prior to abolition of the
quotas, an outward shift in the supply curve must confront a relatively inelastic demand
curve. After abolition of the quotas, the overall demand curve facing the country becomes
more elastic, and hence the favorable terms of trade effect much larger, which more than
makes up  for  the loss  of the quota-induced positive price  effects mentioned in  the
23 Another factor contributing to this outcome is the Armington specification used in the GTAP model. Because
exports and products sold on the domestic market are the same, the increased demand for imports by India can be met
without large increases in import prices.
24 This is the key parameter in determining the export demand elasticities.
19previous  paragraph. The allocative efficiency effect is  also larger because, after the
reform, the increase in  productivity allows a  much greater increase in  imports over
India's high tariff barriers. The overall effect is to roughly triple the gains from domestic
reform.
This experiment considers only the impact of improving productivity in the Indian
clothing sector. The abolition of the MFA quotas agreed in the Uruguay Round will, of
course, not be confined to India, but will cover all affected exporters. 25 While model-
based research suggests that South Asia will gain from this process (Yang, Martin and
Yanagishima  1997), it will  face  greatly increased  competition in  the  industrialized
country markets. Unless the pace of reforms is maintained, South Asia is likely to suffer
severely from this increase in competition.
VI Conclusions
This study set out the basic economics of the MFA applicable to the South Asian
countries, and examined the implications for domestic reform. The key to assessing the
implications  of  this  discriminatory regime  is  to  recognize the  implications of  price
discrimination between markets. This discrimination means that any quota gains in the
restricted industrial markets must be weighed against losses in the unrestricted markets,
where prices are depressed by the regime.
A key set of parameters for any evaluation of the MFA is the magnitude of the
implicit export taxes that are imposed on a country's  exports of textiles and clothing.
These taxes were found to be substantial in an earlier study by Kathuria and Bhardwaj.
Updates of these estimates suggest that the export tax equivalents of these quotas may
well have declined in  1996, but appear to have increased in  1999 to  an average of 40
percent in the USA and 20 percent in the EU-imposing  substantial barriers to Indian
exports.
The limited available evidence about impacts on South Asia suggests that the
gains from domestic reform to raise productivity in these industries will greatly increase
25 The timing of the abolition of  restrictions on non-members of the GATT 1947, such as China, will depend on the
provisions of their entry into WTO, or on bilateral agreements they reach with the importing countries.
20following abolition of the quotas.  Part of the increase in the gains comes from increases
in the scale of the industry experiencing the productivity gain, but  another important
source of gains is a reduction in the terms of trade losses associated with increased textile
and clothing exports. Following removal of the quotas, important parts of world textile
and clothing markets are much more price responsive. Overall, there are substantial terms
of trade gains when productivity rises after the abolition of the quotas because resources
are attracted into clothing and out of sectors where export demand curves are relatively
inelastic. Overall gains of around $2 billion per year were found for India alone from
increasing productivity by 67 percent in the clothing sector, to bring it roughly into line
with China.
Policy makers may have been prepared to accept a slow pace of reform in these
sectors in the past, when opportunities were restricted. To do so in the future would mean
missing out on potentially much greater direct gains from productivity improvements. In
addition, it would expose these industries to much greater risk of losing  ground in  a
fiercely competitive world market.  Finally, as trade barriers start coming down following
WTO negotiations, for example in India, the industries also face substantially increased
competition in their home markets, which lends an urgency to domestic policy reform.
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